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Egon Bittner was a phenomenological sociologist who made extensive and 
fundamental contributions to ethnomethodology, the sociological study of mental 
illness, organisational sociology, the sociology of professions, and to the study of 
police and police work. His studies of the police are justly famous, and earned 
him the soubriquet ‘criminologist’. However, his work is not limited to what may 
be perceived as criminology and we suggest that the prima facie categorisation of 
his studies as ‘criminology’ hides the aspect of his police studies as elaborative of 
his work on organisations.
This paper provides an overview of Bittner’s sociological work. Reviews and 
critiques of his work on crime and policing are available elsewhere (Brodeur 1994 
2001). This paper details themes, e.g., Bittner’s engagement with colleagues who 
were attempting to work out how sociology accounted for sociological phenome‐
na, inter alia, Harold Garfinkel and Edward Rose; Rose’s ‘Larimer Street’ ethno‐
graphies on Denver’s skid row, which Bittner joined to conduct fieldwork with the 
police; and Bittner’s observations on the use of statistics and adequacy of methods 
for discipline-specific and organisational purposes. These threads consolidate an 
overview of Bittner as a phenomenological sociologist – and his seminal contribu‐
tions to ethnomethodology and ethnography – as well as a researcher on policing; 
studies of police work may have been his bailiwick, but we suggest that policing 
was an adventitious and specialised expression of his sociological work.2
PROFILE
Born in Nový Bohumín, Czechoslovakia, in 1921, Egon Bittner migrated to the 
United States following the Second World War. He studied for a B.A. at Los 
Angeles State College, before his Masters and Doctorate in sociology at UCLA, 
under the supervision of Donald R. Cressey; he was awarded his Ph.D. in 1961.3 
During his graduate studies he worked as a research social scientist at the Langley 
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Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute at the University of California, a position that 
provided insights not just into the psychiatric profession but various professions 
that had dealings with people with mental illnesses. Whilst still a graduate 
student, Bittner got a job as an instructor at University of California at Riverside, 
joining a staff alongside Aaron Cicourel; when he was awarded his Ph.D. he was 
appointed to a tenure-track position as an assistant professor. Hence, Bittner left 
UCLA just as Larry Wieder and Don Zimmerman were embarking upon their 
doctoral studies there (Wieder et al. 2010). Cicourel left UC Riverside to take up a 
position at University of California Santa Barbara (cf. Maynard et al. 2010: 316) 
before Bittner moved to the Department of Sociology, Brandeis University (1968–
91). At Brandeis he held the Harry Coplan Professorial Chair of Social Sciences 
and was Chair of the Department of Sociology, was a member of the Commission 
on Accreditation for Law Enforcement, which named a prestigious award after 
him, received the Police Executive Research Forum’s 1998 Leadership Award, was 
a co-founder and co-editor (with Sheldon L. Messinger) of the Criminology 
Review Yearbook, a long-standing member of the editorial board at Human 
Studies (Psathas 2010: 187), one of the original committee members of the 
International Institute for Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis (IIEM‐
CA) (Psathas 2010: 189), and was President of the Society for the Study of Social 
Problems, 1981–82.4
His membership of high-level police associations, awards and writings lend 
themselves unproblematically to the disciplinary characterisation ‘criminologist’; 
however, within the ethnomethodological literature, Bittner has always been 
regarded as one of the most senior ethnomethodologists.5 As a student of Harold 
Garfinkel at UCLA, he collaborated on two of the papers that were included in 
Studies in Ethnomethodology,6 each of which are seminal innovations in the study 
of methods and methodology, coding and classifying, theory and theorising, and 
the agenda for and use of textual records in sociological inquiries.
BITTNER IN CONTEXT(S)
During his doctoral studies at UCLA, and with the encouragement of his supervi‐
sor Donald Cressey, Bittner took courses with Garfinkel, at that time a new and 
junior member of faculty. Garfinkel had become friends with Edward Rose, a 
professor at the University of Colorado, Boulder, following their meetings at 
conferences held in New Mexico. The work of Garfinkel and Rose shared certain 
elective affinities. As Rose was a more senior figure in sociology, he was able to 
support and apply for grants and funding for collaborative enterprises that would 
become known as ‘ethnomethodology’. Even though Garfinkel’s and Rose’s 
interests would eventually diverge, Bittner met them when they were both 
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preoccupied by people’s use of natural language. Both saw natural language and 
people’s natural-language practices as central but entirely missed in traditional 
sociology.
In taking natural language practices as the cornerstone of sociology, each 
asked how social order was possible – for Durkheimian sociology (Rose) and 
Parsonian sociology (Garfinkel). Their admiration for these writers is well 
documented, and each attempted to clarify how the contributions of society-
members established and elaborated their approaches. Garfinkel’s unpublished 
lectures and writings, including an unfinished book7 demonstrated his thorough‐
going engagement with Parsons’ theoretical structures, prior to and in his devel‐
opment of ethnomethodology, which was both a reaction to and stands as a fitting 
tribute to Parsons’ reasoning. Rose, on the other hand, attempted to specify 
Durkheim’s notion of ‘collective representations’. For Rose, Durkheimian social 
facts were not simply ex cathedra theorisations but were traceable and retrievable 
through historical records of members’ language practices, such as dictionaries, 
and the Oxford English Dictionary in particular.
Rose demonstrated how words act as ‘cultural units’ – they are units of 
meaning. Words have meanings and these meanings have histories, which can be 
transformed and, occasionally, lost from the record: ‘Words are intended to 
convey meaning, and, for any group of peers, the presumption is always held that 
some understandings are shared or can be shared through words’ (Rose 1962: 
159–60). Ordinary meanings, as opposed to meanings of words appropriated and 
redefined by sociologists for their own special purposes (Rose 1960), are uniform 
features of a culture. Shared understandings are the results of ‘people putting 
culture to use’ (Rose 1962: 159). Rose demonstrated how ordinary words, in their 
many forms as found in the ‘English Record’ (Rose 1960), become increasingly 
distanced from their ‘natural sociological meanings’ (Rose 1962: 134). The 
reallocation of meanings, to words with natural meanings, is accomplished when 
sociologists apply ordinary words as technical concepts.
Rose’s arguments are expressed through Bittner’s (1965) ‘The Concept of 
Organization’ paper; though, arguably, there is a more Wittgensteinian emphasis 
in Bittner’s criterion of members’ terms and meanings in use not just in textual 
accounts of members’ uses of terms and meanings. Further, in realising the 
determinations of praxiological use of terms that are re-associated with core 
sociological concepts, such as ‘bureaucratic organisation’, we see an elision of pre-
given theoretical structures. As a consideration of ‘The Concept of Organization’ 
shows (Coulter 1996: 340), looking at how members’ concepts are realised as 
‘macro’ concepts provides for a respecification of ‘macro’ structures in sociology, 
problematising even further the dualistic character of some of the key organising 
principles of sociology.8
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It can be seen then that Garfinkel and Rose provided Bittner with crucial 
analytic contexts.9 The phenomenological concerns of Garfinkel combined with 
the sociologically linguistic orientation pushed by Rose, coalesce in Bittner’s ‘The 
Concept of Organization’. Bittner pushed a ‘strong’ version of Schütz, as shown 
by ‘The Concept of Organization’ and his ‘Radicalism’ paper (Bittner 1963).
The themes of the papers he co-authored with Garfinkel – who count as a 
member, and who decides who count as a member – share resemblances with 
Bittner’s discussion of producing an admissible cohort that was satisfactory-in-
accordance-with canons of sociological rigour for the administration of a socio‐
logical study (Bittner 1961: 156–70). A later paper (Conklin and Bittner 1973) 
exhibits the ‘normal, natural troubles’ (Garfinkel and Bittner 1967a: 187ff.) that 
are encountered by sociologists gathering crime statistics. In the production and 
analysis of statistics, Conklin and Bittner worked with the entire data-set, not 
merely a ‘slice’ or ‘representative sample’. Claims made on the basis of statistics 
are deflated, via explication of conjectures, and ‘just how’ conjectures may be 
afforded by data. Rather than attempting to use data that have been gathered for 
non-sociological purposes to do the sociologist’s work, ‘where we found the 
records ambiguous or unclear, we sought and obtained the help of the officer in 
charge of the records or other officers who had the information we needed’ (Con‐
klin and Bittner 1973: 210) and supplemented data analysis with fieldwork. That 
is, Conklin and Bittner produced a quasi ethnography of crime statistics. From 
this description, it should be obvious that not all Bittner’s publications could be 
glossed as ‘ethnomethodological’ or have prima facie relevance to ethnomethodol‐
ogy. However, we may discriminate a form of methodological adequacy in the 
assembly and use of statistics that is expressed by studies such as this as well as 
those by Bittner’s contemporaries (Cicourel 1968; 1974; Garfinkel 1948; Sudnow 
1965).
Bittner concretised his work on organisations, and at the same time provided a 
coruscating critique of Weberian verstehen sociology, in arguably one of his most 
famous papers (Bittner 1965), albeit one that is both ‘undervalued’ and rarely 
explicated in its own terms (Anderson, Hughes and Sharrock 1990: 237; Orr 
2006: 1807).10 To use Garfinkel’s phrase, its ‘corpus status’ as an ethnomethod‐
ological study was confirmed when it was reprinted in an early collection of 
papers on ethnomethodology (Turner 1974); and its inclusion in a multi-volume 
celebration of ethnomethodological work (Lynch and Sharrock 2003) attests to its 
longevity and its pre-eminence within the field. This highlighting of Bittner’s 
(1965) paper is more than an acknowledgement of an early study but a pointer 
towards the continuing presence of his work: for example, contributors to a new 
volume of ethnomethodological studies of work (Rouncefield and Tolmie 2011) 
locate their inquiries in reference to Bittner’s (1965) paper.
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‘The Concept of Organization’ influenced subsequent organisational studies 
(inter alia, Anderson et al. 1990; Orr 1996; Watson 1986; Watson and Sharrock 
1990; Zimmerman 1966), which have a high profile in sociology of organisations, 
ethnomethodological and ‘studies of work’ literatures, and have, in turn, been 
influential texts in their own right. Its high-profile presence and importance within 
ethnomethodological subfields derives, perhaps, from its generative qualities, such 
is the variety of uses which ‘The Concept of Organization’ affords. The paper is 
suffused with luminous explications of members’ accounting practices that have 
been critical in the pursuance of ethnomethodological inquiries. For example, 
‘theoretical short circuit’, ‘terms and determinations’, authorisation through 
members’ ‘bona fides’, ‘corroborative reference’, ‘gambit of compliance’, ‘stylistic 
unity’; all these feature in Bittner’s concision and are available for subsequent 
ethnomethodological analyses (Button et al. 2012). Bittner’s articulation of bona 
fides – how people are recognised by others to possess the knowledge and 
authority to define situations – consolidated his notions of ‘competence’ and 
‘membership’, which are signature concepts of the Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) 
paper, as Bittner had explored earlier in his Ph.D. (Bittner 1961; 1980) and his 
considerations of psychiatry (e.g., Bittner 1968)11 and police work.
We can see also that Bittner (1965: 239, n. 1) provides an initial iteration of 
the ‘haecceity’ (then, quiddity) argument that would feature strongly in the ‘pulsar 
paper’ (Garfinkel et al. 1981) as one of the auspices of ethnomethodological 
studies, in contrast to studies which ‘lose the phenomenon’.
For those sociologists who read it, Egon Bittner’s (1965) challenge to organisa‐
tion theory, and organisational sociology, required of them irrevocable change in 
how they approached their inquiries. Bittner provided not just a critique but a 
programmatic research agenda for work not just on ‘organisations’ but upon 
socially organised phenomena:
Plucked from its native ground, i.e., the world of common sense, the concept of 
rational organization, and the schematic determinations that are subsumed under it, 
are devoid of information on how its terms relate to facts. Without knowing the 
structure of this relationship of reference, the meaning of the concept and its terms 
cannot be determined.
In this situation an investigator may use one of three research procedures. He 
can, for one thing, proceed to investigate formal organization while assuming that 
the unexplicated common-sense meanings of the terms are adequate definitions for 
the purposes of his investigation. In this case, he must use that which he proposes to 
study as a resource for studying it.
He can, in the second instance, attach to the terms a more or less arbitrary 
meaning by defining them operationally. In this case, the relationship of reference 
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between the term and the facts to which it refers will be defined by the operations 
of inquiry. Interest in the actor’s perspective is either deliberately abandoned, or 
some fictitious version of it is adopted.
The investigator can, in the last instance, decide that the meaning of the 
concept, and of all the terms and determinations that are subsumed under it, must 
be discovered by studying their use in real scenes of action by persons whose 
competence to use them is socially sanctioned.
It is only the last case which yields entirely to the rule specifying the relevance of 
the perspective of the actor in sociological inquiry. This is so because in order to 
understand the meaning of the actor’s thought and action, which Weber sought, one 
must study how the terms of his discourse are assigned to real objects and events by 
normally competent persons in ordinary situations.
(Bittner 1965:  247)
This extended quote has been reprinted here because it exhibits a family 
resemblance with the ‘analytic mentality’ – to use Jim Schenkein’s (1978) term – 
of ethnomethodology. Bittner’s summary encapsulates the differences between and 
the radically alternate nature of formal-sociological and ethnomethodological 
inquiries. Embedded within a discursus on organisations and organisation theory, 
Bittner clarified not only the methodological inadequacies of traditional sociologi‐
cal, formal-analytic approaches, including Weberian approaches, to the study of 
organisations; Bittner’s programmatic statement provided a radical, alternate 
research agenda to the emergent field of ethnomethodology.
This agenda is followed through in his book, The Functions of the Police in 
Modern Society,12 as Bittner elaborated: ‘instead of attempting to divine the role 
of the police from programmatic idealizations, we should seek to discern this role 
by looking to those reality conditions and practical circumstances to which the 
formulas presumably apply’ (Bittner 1970: 4–5). By ‘constructing theoretical 
puppets that do nothing other than what a specific theorist proposes’ (Wieder 
1971: 108), formal-analytic sociology is limited to working with decontextualised, 
reified idealisations of members and organisations. Idealisations nullify competent 
membership in theoretical accounts of social organisation: members’ competence 
is ‘theorised out’ by formal analysis through formal-analytic practices of theoris‐
ing. Members become bit players in their own lives as sociologically retold. The 
skills with which they ‘do the organization’s work’ (Watson 1986) disappear in a 
theory-driven cloud.
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CHALLENGING THE ‘CANONS OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD’
A feature of sociology has been the ‘problem’ of ‘objectivity’ in sociology, at least 
what ‘objectivity’ could possibly be, regardless of whether ‘objectivity’ is detached 
from the canonical standards of scientific [sic] inquiry in the social sciences 
(Bittner 1973: 117). In various formulations Bittner would refer to the nature of 
attempting to satisfy the canons of scientific method, which was an avowedly 
phenomenological approach towards the ‘scientific’ or ‘analytic attitude’ and ‘the 
normal, ordinary, traditionally sanctioned world-view’ (Bittner 1963: 929). Such 
formulations implicate science, sociology’s scientific pretensions, and sociology 
itself.
Bittner’s contributions to ethnomethodology can be seen in a context where 
‘objectivity’ is a formal-analytic idealisation produced by theorising social orders, 
which may be achieved or, at least, approximated towards, through the use of 
formal-analytic methods. ‘Methodology’ is a gloss for the epistemological bases 
for doing research – the nature of knowledge, the nature of phenomena to be 
studied by a discipline, rather than how access to those phenomena can be 
realised (methods). This distinction is instructably observable in books entitled 
Methodology of the Social Sciences (Kaufmann 1944; Weber 1949) and is 
elaborated by texts that discuss aspects and logical implications of doing research 
and doing writing in sociology and the social sciences (Winch 1958; Znaniecki 
1968). Such that, for example, phenomena that are the proper topics of sociology 
are only available from particular approaches, e.g., that take account of ‘subjec‐
tive meanings’ (Weber 1947), or of the ‘humanistic coefficient’ (Znaniecki 1927).
Bittner challenges the formal-analytic conception of sociology as a programme 
that adheres to a set or canon of criteria for judging scientific adequacy. Method‐
ology neither describes nor dictates methods; rather, the methodology-discipline 
nexus revolves around the ‘clarification of meanings’ (Kaufmann 1944: 46). 
Unfortunately, in formal-analytic inquiries the practices of theorising and search 
for ‘objectivity’ do prescribe methodic options, formulated as ‘methodogenic 
ontology’ (Wieder 1980). The methodogenic ontology of formal analysis imposes 
limitations upon the range of phenomena that are available to FA inquiries. 
Formal-analytic inquirers may combine methods – at the risk of conflating 
different language games and producing category-mistakes (Watson 1992) – but 
do not take the radical ethnomethodological turn of developing methods to suit 
the phenomenon of inquiry (Livingston 1995).13 Harold Garfinkel would work 
through the ‘problem of objectivity’ through the phenomenological bracketing of 
researchable phenomena, which he formulated as ‘ethnomethodological indiffer‐
ence’ (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970). Bittner was also concerned with this issue, the 
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realisation of how the ‘canons of scientific method’ (Bittner 1963: 931) were 
inappropriate to studying phenomena of social organisation.14
‘Science’ – its relation to sociology – has always been constitutive of the 
sociological firmament (Mills 1959) but the implications of its relevance for 
sociology (or what was assumed to be relevant for sociology) remained unexpli‐
cated (Kaufmann 1944). The terms of the science/common sense debate reappear 
under various guises and under various auspices of the ‘canons of scientific 
objectivity’ (Bittner 1973: 114).15 A diverse corpus of writing (inter alia, Dennis 
2003; Elliot 1974; Garfinkel 1960b; Husserl 1970; Pollner 1987; Schütz 1943; 
1953; Sharrock and Anderson 1991; Winch 1958) deflates the apparent dichoto‐
my between scientific and common-sense forms of knowledge, or the dichotomy 
between the common-sense attitude and the theoretic attitude.
Part of a wider tendency to dichotomise sociological approaches, reducing 
debate to series of dualisms (such as structure/agency, macro/micro) that are 
‘derivations’ from philosophical foundations (Sharrock and Watson 1988), the 
objectivity/subjectivity opposition is based upon misapprehensions regarding the 
determinations of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ (Sharrock and Anderson 1991). 
These misapprehensions create needless positions and in so doing afford erro‐
neous attributions of positions, a form of misplaced perspectivism, e.g., that if 
approaches are not ‘objective’ then they have to be ‘subjective’ (Sharrock and 
Watson 1988). When it is clarified that ethnomethodology is not objective it is 
mischaracterised as its ‘opposite’, subjective, even when clarification insists that 
ethnomethodology is indifferent to and resists the language game of such theoris‐
ing.
Bittner elaborated upon the traditional frameworks of structure/agency, 
objective/subjective via a phenomenological approach. For Bittner, it was the 
determinations of sociological analysis, not just the (at times partisan) terms of 
any particular form of sociological analysis, which was at issue. Bittner argued 
that formal-analytic inquiries will always remain inchoate and parasitical on 
members’ common-sense reasoning because ‘sociologists always attempt to render 
accounts of matters about which accounts already exist. For example, to be 
analysed, kinship structure is always already known to those who constitute it. 
Furthermore, the sociologist is required to draw the terms of his analysis from 
what is known from the perspective of the actor. Consequently, to gratify the hope 
for a scientifically objective sociological account the sociologist would have to 
substitute objective for indexical expressions. … [N]o-one has ever succeeded in 
the objective study of society without relaxing canons of objectivity, and therefore 
it is not unreasonable to argue that this relaxation is indispensable’ (Bittner 1973: 
116). Here we are witnessing the themes of competence and membership, regard‐
ing what can be studied, and by whom.16
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However, Bittner does not here provide an entry point with formal-analytic 
inquiries that are seen to be ‘subjective’ rather than ‘objective’. In his paper 
‘Objectivity and Realism in Sociology’, Bittner (1973) distances ethnomethod‐
ological inquiry from the then dominant ‘qualitative’ sociological approach – 
Symbolic Interactionism (SI) – which he argues is characterised by the develop‐
ment of theoretical ‘structures’ and layers of conceptualisation that cannot 
approach the phenomena of social interactional orders that SI purportedly 
describes. Bittner anticipates the demarcations of ethnomethodology and ‘qualita‐
tive’ formal-analytic approaches, such as ‘construction’ (Pollner 1987: 161), 
which were formulated later (Garfinkel and Wiley 1980);17 and he anticipates the 
development and limitations of (what would later be called) ‘postmodern ethnog‐
raphy’ (Travers 2001: 161). Bittner elaborates on the methodological aspects of 
theoretical options in ‘qualitative’ sociology, particularly SI and its relative 
position to ethnomethodology, a ‘perspicuous’ juncture that, at the time, had been 
subjected to considerable consideration (Wieder 1971; Zimmerman and Wieder 
1971).
Indeed, Bittner here deflates (what Howard Schwartz would call) the ‘news 
from nowhere’ aspect of ‘qualitative’ forms of sociology. One of Schwartz’ 
arguments is how ‘qualitative’ sociologists must attempt to make their studies 
stand apart from ‘what “everybody” knows’ – when the sociologist shares the 
natural language with both the group being studied and the group to whom the 
study is presented. The novelty of any ‘findings’ is further compromised because 
sociologists, who will be the audience for the study, share the same natural 
language as the group being studied. To circumvent this problem, the qualitative 
sociologist can select groups ‘so that their daily lives are substantially 
disjointed’ (Schwartz 2002: 104) whereby the study exhibits ‘insiders’ accounts 
which are no news to the insiders themselves, but which have the status of 
findings for the group to which they are presented’ (Schwartz 2002: 105).
Bittner’s (1973) appeal for a more explicative sociology, what we can refer to 
as avoiding ‘methodological irony’, locates asymmetries between the observer and 
the observed not as a theorised, artificial-but-real for-all-practical-purposes 
encounter, e.g., characterised by an ‘unequal power relationship’, but a practical 
real-world occasion between members who share a command of natural-language 
competencies, what Schütz termed the ‘natural attitude’, but that this encounter is 
subject to the post hoc analytic relevances of the observer. Bittner’s call for 
explication takes the form, ‘if the field worker’s claim to realism and to respect for 
the perspective of the actor are to be given serous credence, then it will have to be 
made clear what from they assume when they are a function not of a natural 
attitude of the actor but of a deliberately appropriated “natural attitude” of the 
observer’ (Bittner 1973: 118).
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As such, the observer-observed encounter is open to the practical work of 
theorising in an analytic attitude (Smith 1974) and, to use Pollner’s term, the 
‘ironicizing of experience’. Bittner’s set of phenomenological arguments in 
‘Objectivity and Realism’ thus contain resonances with Peter Winch’s Wittgen‐
steinian counter to Alisdair MacIntyre (1962): ‘When MacIntyre goes on to say 
that the observer “cannot omit reference to the rationality or otherwise of those 
rules and conventions” followed by the alien agent, whose concept of rationality 
is now in question: ours or the agent’s? Since the observer must be understood 
now as addressing himself to members of his own society, it seems that the 
reference must here be to the concept of rationality current in the observer’s 
society’ (Winch 1974: 97).
CONCLUSION
Recognising Bittner’s phenomenological rather than Wittgensteinian emphasis 
does not accord with an attribution of his being solely of historical interest within 
the development of ethnomethodology. It is possible that locating Bittner’s work 
as expressing a commitment to phenomenology within ethnomethodology, or 
considering Bittner’s sociological writings in a historical or chronological context, 
obscure the continued relevance of his work to the programme of 
respecification.18 As we argued earlier, his paper ‘The Concept of Organization’ set 
an agenda for ethnomethodological inquiries. However, this is an agenda that 
continues to provide a rationale for ethnomethodological studies, shown by its 
use in recent contributions to the ‘ethnomethodological studies of work’ pro‐
gramme (Rouncefield and Tolmie 2011). Orr (2006) describes how ‘The Concept 
of Organization’ afforded an analytic approach that was more appropriate than 
traditional organisational models to studying organisational work, and members’ 
work as employees of organisations. Coulter (1996) also shows that ‘The Concept 
of Organization’ affords a respecification of traditional sociological topics. In a 
chapter dedicated to the respecification of epistemology as a sociological concept, 
Sharrock and Anderson (1991) demonstrate the perspicuous and crucial interven‐
tion of Bittner’s ‘Objectivity and Realism in Sociology’, in which Bittner identifies 
epistemological and methodological troubles that should be topics of explication 
for sociologists if they hope to satisfy the expectations or pretensions of scientific 
status (Sharrock and Anderson 1991). Indeed, they highlight its continued 
relevance for the debate, endogenous to ethnomethodology, problematising the 
use of the term ‘construction’. Given its uncritical appropriation by formal-
analytic sociologies to be pressed into service regardless of topic – a theme 
explored in ‘The Structure of Psychiatric Influence’ (Bittner 1968) – ‘Objectivity 
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3. Bittner (1961), published in 1980 by Arno Press, New York.
4. For his presidential address to the SSSP, see Bittner (1983).
5. E.g., Garfinkel (1967); Garfinkel and Sacks (1970). See Garfinkel (2007), wherein 
Bittner is described not only as one of ‘ethnomethodology’s authors’ (passim) but as the 
author of ‘exemplary studies’ (p.19). See Psathas (2006: 253).
6. Garfinkel and Bittner (1967a; 1967b).
7. Parsons’ Primer (Garfinkel 1960a). His Ph.D. thesis (Garfinkel 1952) and proximate 
writings (e.g., Garfinkel nd), as well as manuscripts edited by Anne W. Rawls (Garfinkel 
2002; 2008) make available the depth of Garfinkel’s appreciation for Parsons.
8. For a recent formulation of Garfinkel’s work and its relevance to formal analysis in 
terms of ‘respecification’, see Lynch (2009: 89). For demonstrations of ‘respecifications’ of 
core sociological topics, see Button (1991).
9. The analytic contexts to which Bittner contributed are detailed in various sources (e.g., 
Heritage 1984; Lynch 1993). It was a serious, high-level engagement. Given the resem‐
blances between Larimer Tours and Harvey Sacks’ (1972) ‘police paper’, in terms of 
‘normal appearances’, one of these contexts was the emergence of ethnomethodology 
(Schegloff 1999).
10. In explicating professional sociological interest in ‘organisation’ for non-sociologists, 
Garfinkel (1956: 181–84) detailed continuities and discontinuities between laic and 
analytic conceptions of the term, one of which being the form of bureaucratic organisation 
treated in Bittner’s paper.
11. This was acknowledged by Garfinkel (1967: 57).
and Realism in Sociology’ is a salutary source on the reification of both topics and 
concepts for doing sociology.
Bittner’s work was vital in the emergence and development of ethnomethodol‐
ogy, and, as shown by the use of his work in recent publications by others, his 
work is of continued importance for the prosecution of sociological projects 
today. To our minds, much of what is regarded as organisational sociology would 
benefit from an engagement with the analytic mentality and observational 
sensibilities of Bittner: then we might see something of the worldly practices 
constitutive of organisations’ work and move toward a peopled social science.
NOTES
12 Andrew P. Carlin and Roger S. Slack
12. This book is also included in Aspects of Police Work (Bittner 1990), a collection of 
essays written for different audiences over time. It makes available a variety of Bittner’s 
papers of interest to criminologists and research on the operations of the police, but there 
is no claim to a ‘thematic unity’ under the auspices of ethnomethodology.
13. Both Livingston and Wieder here provide ethnomethodological elaborations of Bittner’s 
summative statement in his Ph.D. dissertation: ‘the conclusions drawn from the data will 
vary with theoretical interest, where conclusions refer primarily to programs of future 
inquiry indicated by the findings’ (Bittner 1961: 244).
14. Of course what ‘scientific method’ consists in and how it is constituted in social science 
is a worldly achievement. Taking one example, the survey interview, Maynard and 
Schaeffer show the ‘interactional substrate’ (2006: 10) or the ‘talk-in-interaction’ that 
achieves the standardised interview.
15. Or, as Garfinkel noted, ‘seen as a procedure of successively transforming, or better 
successively reconstituting a world, any world, in accordance with the particular rules of 
the scientific attitude and the procedures of the scientific method’ (Garfinkel nd: 4).
16. Competence regarding topics of inquiry is formulated elsewhere as the ‘[s]ocially-
sanctioned-facts-of-life-in-society-that-any-bona-fide-member-of-society-knows’ (Garfinkel 
1959: 51). Limits of analytic privilege according to membership are summarised in the 
same source: ‘Just as sociological inquiries are not confined to professional sociologists, 
neither is the attitude of daily life confined to the ‘man in the street’’ (Garfinkel 1959: 55).
17. Using Pollner as an example, Sharrock and Anderson (1991: 76) note how approaches 
to ‘construction’ differ within ethnomethodology as a corpus, and within corpora of 
individual ethnomethodologists.
18. It is of note that while some of Alfred Schütz’ work had not fully expunged a cognitive 
cast, which was problematic for the programme of respecification, that some of Aron 
Gurwitsch’s work (e.g., Gurwitsch 1964), subject to ‘ethnomethodological misreadings’, 
featured directly in Garfinkel’s formulation of respecification (e.g., Garfinkel 1996).
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